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THE POLITICS OF DELEGATION IN EUROPEAN BANKING UNION: 




The nature and scope of the European Central Banks’s (‘ECB’) oversight mandate over the 
supervision of smaller and medium banks by national supervisors has been one of the most 
debated aspects of the newly created European Banking Union. In particular, the issue 
whether the ECB should influence already established national supervisory practises and 
standards was not immediately straightforward. This paper applies the Principal-Agent (‘PA’) 
approach to explore the extent of the ECB supranational agency governing the supervisory 
oversight policies in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (‘SSM’). Notably, one of the 
important features of the SSM institutional design is the contractual incompleteness of 
supranational delegation. The ECB has been granted discretion to fill-in the agency contract 
concluded with the Member States. A brief analysis of the practical operationalization of the 
ECB oversight role suggests that the ECB could exploit this contract condition to pursue own 
policy goals (agency hold-up problem) and situate itself in “bureaucratic drift” vis-à-vis the 
Member-State principals. However, under slightly relaxed Principal-Agent assumptions 
which assume proactive role of the agent in reducing information asymmetries vis-à-vis its 
principal, it is also possible that the ECB managed to influence the Member States’ stance, 
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INTRODUCTION 
On 3 November 2013, the Council Regulation establishing the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism entered into force (‘SSM Regulation’). It delegated to the European Central Bank 
(‘ECB’) a number of supervisory tasks related to prudential supervision of credit institutions 
in the newly created Banking Union (‘BU’)i. In doing so, it set up the first and key pillar of 
the Banking Union – a common supervisory framework for banks headquartered in the Euro 
Area (‘EA’) Member States and those non-EA Member States which opt-in to join (Howarth 
and Quaglia 2016b). The Single Supervisory Mechanism (‘SSM’) is a new multi-level 
governance structure to carry out prudential tasks in the BU which is characterized by 
obligatory supervisory cooperation between European and national policy-making levels. In 
this framework, the ECB directly supervises large and systemically important banks referred 
to as significant institutions (‘SIs’). According to Article 6(5)(c) of SSM Regulation, it also 
performs oversight over the whole supervisory system by monitoring the conduct of direct 
supervision of smaller and medium sized banks (less significant institutions, ‘LSIs’) which 
remain in the scope of national competence (National Competent Authorities, ‘NCAs’). In 
this capacity, it does not act as a direct supervisor but rather as a supervisor of national 
supervisors (Lackhoff 2013).  
Insights derived from the Principal-Agent and contract theories offer to shed some light not 
only on the institutional complexities of the European integration but also on activism of 
supranational institutions, agencies and other bodies in the EU. In this context, the PA 
literature assumes that supranational institutions (agents) will carry out delegated tasks in line 
with the Member States’ governments policy preferences (Pollack 1997). Such a delegation 
of tasks is perceived as an agency contract concluded between rationally oriented actors: the 
principal(s) and the agent(s).  
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However, in contractual relations ‘contingencies inevitably arise that have not been planned 
for and, when they do, the parties must find ways to adapt’ (Milgrom and Roberts 1992: 128). 
This implies that any contract is inherently incomplete in its nature (i.a. Williamson 1985; 
Cooley and Spruyt 2009). The fact that the Member States are a collective rather than a 
unitary principal, with possibly differing policy preferences, adds another twist to the analysis 
of delegation between the Member-State principals and their supranational agents.  
This paper looks at the institutional design of the Single Supervisory Mechanism in terms of 
incomplete delegation contract between the Council (collective principal) and ECB (agent). 
Indeed, Article 6(7) of SSM Regulation leaves the ECB with discretion to define a 
framework for its cooperation with the NCAs when carrying out different supervisory 
functions in the SSM. This applies not only to the ECB direct supervision, but also to its 
oversight role over the functioning of the system. 
My contribution focuses on second of the abovementioned features of the SSM institutional 
design. It discusses the process of the operationalization of the ECB’s oversight role in the 
SSM (‘oversight policies in the SSM’). The ECB direct supervision of significant banks is 
out of the scope of this paper. Oversight policies in the SSM are perceived in terms of filling-
in the incomplete delegation contract between the ECB and Council which was framed in the 
SSM Regulation. I argue that in shaping its oversight role, the ECB pushed its own policy 
objectives and went beyond the initial stance formulated by the Council. In light of the 
Principal-Agent framework, this can be seen as stretching the boundaries of the original 
mandate, possibly implying a form of ‘bureaucratic drift’/‘agency slack’. However, under 
slightly relaxed Principal-Agent assumptions this situation could be also contemplated as a 
genuine form of “bureaucratic entrepreneurship” resulting from the ECB’s proactive attempts 
to reduce original information asymmetries vis-à-vis its Member-State principals concerning 
highly complex and intricate matters related to banking supervision.  
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In doing so, I seek to contribute to the studies on the activism of supranational institutions by 
exploring cases of the agency’s hold-up. This term describes situations, in which the agent 
thoroughly uses gaps in incomplete contracts — in which all future positions are not specified 
— to pursue own preferences (Gilardi 2001). My research ultimately aims to support the 
claim that contractual incompleteness tends to increase the agent’s discretion and hence its 
autonomy vis-à-vis its political principal(s) (Rittberger, Leuffen & Schimmelfennig 2012). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The first section introduces the 
theoretical underpinnings to analyse the dynamics of supranational policy-making through 
the Principal-Agent and contract theory lens. The second section applies this analytical 
framework to explore the delegation of the oversight policies in the SSM, both from the 
principal and agent perspective. It investigates the development of the Member States’ and 
ECB’s initially differing stances on the SSM oversight policies and explains them in terms of 
the ECB’s wide discretionary powers in the BU’s supervisory policy-making.  
SUPRANATIONAL POLICY-MAKING AND PRINCIPAL-AGENT APPROACH 
Delegation theory and rational choice 
The principal-agent model, according to Ross’ celebrated definition, is a mean of 
understanding the relationship “between two (or more) parties when one of these, designated 
the agent, acts on behalf of or as representative for the other, the principal” (Ross 1973: 134). 
In the past 20 years, the Principal-Agent model has become an increasingly attractive tool for 
the analysis of EU policy-making dynamics in different areas (see for example: Tallberg 
2002; Kassim and Menon 2003; Pollack 1997, 2007). Depending on the policy area covered, 
the nature and scope of delegated mandate may vary: starting from agenda-setting, 
information collection, representation, decision-making, to monitoring of compliance and 
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enforcement. It has been applied to explain multiple relations between the EU Member States 
and EU institutions in many public policies, including such areas as judicial policy-making 
(Garrett 1995), trade policy (Elsig 2007), central banking (Elgie 2002) economic governance 
(Hodson 2009).  
There exists a vast body rational choice literature analysing the motivations that lead the 
Member-State principals to confer authority upon supranational agents. Delegation is 
explained in functional terms driven by a desire to minimize transaction costs (Hall and 
Taylor 1996) and ensure credible interstate commitments (Tallberg 2002), in particular by 
overcoming problems of collective action (Axelrod 2006), improving the quality of policy in 
technical areas (Egan 1998) and limiting regulatory competition between interdependent 
states which have incentives to treat their own firms leniently (Majone 1994; Egan 1998). 
The latter reason seems to be of a particular relevance in the context of recent integration of 
banking supervision in the EU. As pointed out by de Larosière report, inconsistent 
implementation of EU banking regulation across Member States’ jurisdictions and together 
with often nationally biased supervisory treatment of home banks facilitated the spread of the 
financial crisis across the EU (De Larosière et al. 2009). 
Nonetheless, the use of the Principal-Agent framework to explain dynamics between 
supranational and national actors in financial (banking) supervision has been limited so far. 
Among one of notable exceptions is of an analysis conducted by Martin Schüler, who 
investigated the Member States’ incentives to delegate banking supervision to the European 
level (Schüler 2003). As a matter of fact, the majority of Principal-Agent work on banking 
supervision was rather concentrated on relations between elected policymakers and 
independent regulatory in context of delegation taking place at national levels. Notably, it 
explored the policymakers choices on the institutional design of bank supervision in the EU 
and around the world (Masciandaro 2004), on the financing of banking supervision where the 
5 
 
JCER special issue ‘Pushing the Boundaries: New Research on the Activism of Supranational Institutions’ 
 
society acts as the principal and banking supervisory authority as the agent (Masciandaro, 
Nieto, Priast 2007) as well as to address the degree of consolidation of powers in financial 
supervision (Masciandaro and Pellegrina 2008). 
Uneasy dynamics of Principal-Agent relations 
A Principal-Agent relation is created when the Member-State principals renounce direct 
exercise of a particular function or a set of tasks and transfer it/them to a 
European/supranational agent (often an EU institution, agency or a body). The latter is 
expected to carry them in line with the preferences expressed by the Member-State principals 
in the agency contract. Such an arrangement involves however certain risks for the principal. 
Even when the principal’s policy preferences are explicitly articulated, one cannot assume 
that the agents are likely to pursue them at all times. This difficulty is known in the classic 
delegation theory as the ‘principal’s problem’ (Ross 1973). It treats agents as opportunistic 
actors who may develop their own preferences, which may diverge from those of their 
principal once the agency contract has been concluded (Kiewet and McCubbins 1991). The 
agents’ perverse incentives to pursue their own policy objectives are stimulated by another 
key assumption of the delegation theory which is an inherently asymmetrical distribution of 
information in a principal-agent relation that favors the agent (Holmstrom 1979, Kiewiet and 
McCubbins 1991).  
Under certain conditions, the principal’s problem may escalate to the so-called ‘bureaucratic 
drift’ or ‘agency slack’, both describing the ability of an agency to enact outcomes different 
from the policies preferred by those who originally delegated power. It may happen when the 
supranational agent pursues policies closer to its goals rather than those enacted by its 
principal and/or attempts to bypass its control by going beyond boundaries of delegated 
authority (Horn and Shepsle 1989; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). These policy objectives 
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may be related to its power and welfare maximization (Niskanen 1975) as well to the 
improvement of its non-majoritarian policymaking legitimacy (Carpenter 2001).  
Additional layer of complexity occurs when the principal consists of multiple actors, as in the 
case of Member-State principals acting in the Council (Hodson 2009). Such a collective 
principal may exhibit divergent policy preferences which can be exploited by an 
opportunistic agent and give him more leeway (Tallberg 2002).  
Insights derived from the contract theory add another twist to the principal’s problem. Any 
ex-ante contract between the principal and the agent is invariably incomplete in its nature 
since it would be extremely costly, if not impossible, to spell out in explicit detail all future 
positions and precise obligations (Williamson 1985). Rather than designing complete 
contingent contracts, the principal-agent relations are embedded in an “incomplete 
contracting framework” (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart 1995; Hart and Moore 1999;) with 
an option to fill in the details of such an incomplete contract left to either the principal, agent 
or a third party. In particular, a very structure of political delegation in which the 
supranational agent is left with the possibility to fill-in the incomplete contract may embolden 
him to use it as a window of opportunity to advance integration in certain policy field 
(Chalmers, Jachtenfuchs, Joerges 2016). Such centripetal activism may not be however in the 
line with its Member-State principals’ original preferences. In the transaction cost politics 
literature, a situation in which the agent exploits incompleteness of contract to pursue its own 
preferences is known as the agency hold-up problem (Epstein & O'Halloran 1999).  
However, information asymmetry may also become detrimental for the agents under the 
conditions of incomplete contracting (Coremans and Kerremans 2016) if the policies pursued 
by the agent considerably deviate from the ones preferred by the principal (Kerremans 2006). 
The vast majority of Principal-Agent literature does not however contemplate a possibility of 
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reducing information asymmetries between the principal and the agent by means other than 
principal-induced controls (“anti-agent bias”). Against this backdrop, a rationally bounded 
agent could be expected to become a policy entrepreneur who proactively seeks to reduce 
information asymmetries vis-à-vis its principal. As a result this kind of the agent’s activism, 
the principal’s preference on the scope of the agent’s discretion may evolve over time.  
Striking a balance between the principal’s control and the agent’s autonomy 
The principal has to find ways to limit the bureaucratic drift/agency slack by encouraging the 
agent’s compliance with the principal’s policy choices and accommodate the agent’s 
incentives to develop preferences contrary to those of its principal. The Principal-Agent 
theoretical toolbox equips the principal with two groups of mechanisms to mitigate the 
possibility of the transgression of the agent’s side. These are administrative (ex-ante) and 
oversight (ex-post) procedures of political control. However, these are not costless measures.  
The ex-ante administrative procedures are put in place to define a scope of agency, legal 
instruments available for the agency and the set of procedures the agents must follow 
(Pollack 1997). They delineate agent’s mandate and its autonomy related to the execution of 
discretionary powers are granted by its principal. The design of administrative procedures 
aiming to establish criteria for decision-making in unforeseen circumstances seems to be of 
particular importance in the context of the problem of incomplete contracting. As noted by 
Moe, leaving as little as possible to discretionary judgment of bureaucratic agents in highly 
complex and technical areas of public policies is not a solution for establishing effective 
organisations since ‘cumbersome, complicated, structures may undermine their capacity to 
perform their jobs well’ (Moe 1990: 228).  
The ex-post oversight procedures allow the principal to monitor its agents’ behavior and react 
in case bureaucratic drift/agency slack is detected. Conventionally, they are divided into 
8 
 
JCER special issue ‘Pushing the Boundaries: New Research on the Activism of Supranational Institutions’ 
 
‘police patrols’ and ‘fire-alarms’ (Kiewet and McCubbins 1991). ‘Police patrols’ consist of 
an active surveillance of a sample of the agent’s behavior by the principal with the aim of 
detecting any of their non-compliance with the principal’s policy preferences. In a classic 
form they include public hearings, studies, field observations and examinations of regular 
agency reports (Pollack, 1997). ‘Fire alarms’ may be described as the principal’s indirect ‘ex 
post’ controls because while monitoring agents’ activities the principal relies on the support 
of third parties. ‘Fire alarms’ are less costly but in the same time they are also less centralized 
and tend to be more superficial than the ‘police patrols’. 
The control mechanisms installed by the Member-State principals over their supranational 
agents may vary from one policy to another policy area and also depend on the nature of 
scope of delegated powers. As such, they may be more or less restrictive which reflects a 
trade-off between the flexibility and comprehensiveness of the agent’s activities (McCubbins 
and Page 1987; McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987). It follows that a degree of the agent’s 
autonomy is primarily a function of the control mechanisms established by the Member-State 
principals to check on their supranational agents (Pollack 2007). Whether or not the agents 
have a discretion to fill-in the incomplete contact directly influences their autonomy vis-à-vis 
their political principals (Rittberger, Leuffen & Schimmelfennig 2012) as well as their 
incentives to pursue own preferences, such as pro-integrationist agenda (Stone Sweet 2010). 
CASE STUDY: THE SUPERVISORY OVERSIGHT POLICIES IN THE 
SSM 
This section draws inspiration from the work conducted by Robert Elgie who investigated the 
delegation of monetary policymaking by the Member-State principals to the ECB (Elgie 
2002). In doing so, it goes one step further and applies the Principal-Agent model between 
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those two actors but to investigate the dynamics inside the newly created Single Supervisory 
Mechanism. In this context, it exclusively focuses on one of the delegated tasks: the nature of 
scope of the ECB’s oversight function over the supervision of less significant banks carried 
out by the NCAs.  
Identifying principal-agent dynamics in the SSM 
In the SSM, the delegation of multiple tasks related to prudential supervision of credit 
institutions takes place between the Member States acting as a collective principal in the 
Council and the European Central Bank which is an EU supranational institution. The agency 
contract between both parties is laid down in the SSM Regulation, which stipulates 
supervisory tasks conferred upon the ECB. Among them, the Member-State principals 
delegated to the ECB a very particular and somewhat vague task – the oversight over the 
whole SSM supervisory system (Article 6(5)(c) of SSM Regulation).  
{Figure 1} 
In this capacity, the ECB acts as the supervisor of national supervisors (Lackhoff 2013) who 
remain responsible for the prudential supervision of less significant banks. The part of the 
agency contract between the ECB and Council regulating the ECB’s oversight function over 
national supervisors (NCAs) provides however only very general principles of ECB-NCA 
relations in this regard. It stipulates that they are governed by a duty of cooperation in good 
faith and an obligation to exchange information (Article 6(2) of SSM Regulation). It follows 
that the delegation contract does between the ECB and CON is incomplete in its nature, with 
the discretion to define a framework of the ECB-NCA relations left to the former (Article 6 
(7) of SSM Regulation).  
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The Member States’ stance on the oversight policies in the SSM 
The primary sources to extract the Member States’ original policy preference may be sought 
in the legal text of the agency contract and official policy statements on the SSM formulated 
by the Council. It shall be however noted that the official documents reflect rather a political 
compromise among diverse positions of individual Member States as of a collective principal 
acting in the Council. Indeed, the range of the Member States’ preferences on the extent of 
the ECB oversight over smaller and medium-sized banks varied from a ‘fully-fledged’ 
supervision as initially proposed by the Commission to more ‘light-touch’ oversight 
dimensions. On one side, some Member States, including France and Netherlands, reported to 
favour a more intrusive oversight function (Howarth and Quaglia 2016a). On the other side, 
there existed also a group of countries, notably Germany, which was opposing the ECB 
strong oversight powers over the conduct national supervision (Schäuble 2012, Lombardi and 
Moschella 2016).  
The outcome was that the ECB’s scope of supervision in the SSM was to be ‘differentiated’ 
(CON 2012). The SSM Regulation confers upon the ECB direct supervision of credit 
institutions considered as “significant” ones whereas other credit institutions (“less 
significant”) remain in the scope of direct national supervisory competence. National 
supervision is however carried out under the ECB oversight which should include at least 
notification of material supervisory procedures and decisions in order to let the ECB express 
its views on them (Article 6 (7)(c) of SSM Regulation). It was however provided that in 
exceptional circumstances the ECB could escalate the intrusiveness of its oversight mandate 
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Furthermore, the Council did not initially provide for a clear ECB’s role as regards promotion 
of the convergence and consistency of different national supervisory practices. This task was 
to remain within the responsibility of the European Banking Authority (CON 2012). All in 
all, one may therefore contend that the initial aggregated preference of the Member-State 
principals on the nature and extent of the ECB oversight function reflected a rather ‘light-
touch’ and ‘backward-looking’ than ‘intrusive’ and ‘forward-looking’ dimension, notably by 
remaining silent on the ECB’s role in fostering the convergence of national supervisory 
approaches.  
To ensure its preferences and cope with a possible bureaucratic drift/agency slack on the ECB 
side, the SSM Regulation equips the Council with certain mechanisms of control. These 
appear to be however limited. In line with the Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision developed by the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS), the ECB 
shall be politically independent (but accountable) when carrying out its supervisory tasks 
(Article 19 and Recital 55 of SSM Regulation). Relatively limited control mechanisms on the 
principal side are reflected in certain ECB accountability arrangements vis-à-vis the Council 
(and the European Parliament). The ECB accountability on supervisory matters is governed 
by Interinstitutional Agreement (‘IIA’) (2013/694/EU) regulating practical aspects the ECB’s 
accountability vis-à-vis the European Parliament and the Memorandum of Understanding 
(‘MoU’) from 29 October 2013 setting the ECB’s accountability arrangements towards the 
Council and the Euro group.  
The Member States’ involvement in appointment of the SSM leadership can be regarded as 
an important ‘ex-ante’ accountability arrangement. As provided by the delegation contact, 
SSM chief supervisors (Chair and Vice-chair of the Supervisory Board) are appointed by the 
Council on the proposal of the Supervisory Board (largely consisting of national 
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representatives) and after the approval of the European Parliament (Article 26(3) SSM 
Regulation). 
Among two main ‘ex-post’ control arrangements, which are closer to ‘police-patrolling’, one 
may list the ECB’s annual reporting on its supervisory activities to the Council/Euro group 
(and the European Parliament) which must cover a range of fields, including the conduct of 
its oversight function (Article 20(2) of SSM Regulation). Furthermore, the Chair of the 
Supervisory Board may be invited to participate in ‘exchange of views’ on the execution of 
supervisory tasks in the SSM with the Euro group in banking union composition (Article 
20(3) of SSM Regulation). More specifically, the Chair must attend at least two such hearings 
and the information exchanged must remain confidential. The Euro group may also request 
additional ‘ad-hoc exchange of views’ (Section I, Paragraph 2 of MoU). The ECB must also 
respond to questions posed by the Euro group (Article 20(6) of the SSM Regulation). Ideally, 
they should be addressed as promptly as possible, and in any event within five weeks of their 
submission (Section I, Paragraph 3 of MoU).ii 
The ECB‘s stance on the oversight policies in the SSM 
To identify the ECB’s policy preference on the nature and scope of its oversight function, it 
may be useful to study the way how the originally incomplete delegation contract was filled-
in and subsequently applied in day-to-day supervisory policymaking by the ECB.  
As it was already noted, the SSM Regulation left to the ECB discretion to define practical 
modalities of the supervisory cooperation between the ECB and NCAs in the SSM, both with 
regard to the ECB direct supervision of significant banks and its oversight over the NCAs. To 
fill in the details of the SSM Regulation, the ECB notably adopted three specific acts: the 
legally binding SSM Framework Regulation (‘FR’)iii and the SSM Regulation on reporting of 
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supervisory financial information (‘SRR’) iv as well as the SSM Supervisory Manual (‘SM’) 
which is an ‘internal staff document’ (ECB 2014a).  
The FR stipulates the rules and procedures governing the cooperation between the ECB and 
NCAs (ECB 2014b). From the perspective of the ECB objectives on its oversight policies, 
two chapters of the FR are of particular significance: Part IV provides the methodology to 
determine significance of SSM credit institutions and Part VII regulates the ECB-NCAs 
relations on the supervision of less significant banks. In the framework of its oversight 
function, the ECB monitors the SSM’s entire banking sector and identifies ‘significant’ banks 
and ‘high-priority’ less significant banks. Furthermore, Part VII of the FR develops key 
preventive and retrospective oversight mechanisms: NCA ex-ante notifications on financial 
deterioration of banks under their supervision and material decisions/procedures (Articles 96-
98 of FR) and NCA ex-post regular reporting obligations on the conduct of their supervision 
(Articles 99-100 of FR).  
Under EU-wide supervisory legislation drafted by the EBAv, financial reporting is mandatory 
for credit institutions applying international accounting standards - International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS). It consists of two components – financial (FINREP)vi and 
common reporting (COREP)vii. The SRR extends these reporting obligations in a 
proportionate way to BU-headquartered credit institutions using country-specific reporting 
standards (nGAAP). For less significant banks, it introduces ‘simplified’, ‘over-simplified’ 
financial reporting and ‘supervisory financial reporting data point’ with corresponding 
reduced sets of templates to be used by banks. It also sets out rules related to the submission 
of information by the NCAs to the ECBviii. The information collected from the NCAs 
provides the ECB with first-hand qualitative and system-wide input necessary to exercise 
efficient oversight over the entire SSM supervisory system.  
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Finally, the ECB further specifies operational aspects and policy objectives of its oversight 
function in the SSM Supervisory Manual. In the public version of this document – Guide to 
banking supervision (ECB 2014c), the ECB lays down organisational arrangements 
governing its oversight function and develops very specific dimensions of this function. The 
ECB oversight function, now officially referred to as the ECB indirect supervision, is located 
at a separate ECB business line – Directorate General Micro-Prudential Supervision III. This 
directorate performs indirect supervision over LSIs understood as supervisory oversight, 
institutional and sectoral oversight, and methodological support (ibid: Paragraph 89). For the 
ECB, the exercise of its oversight responsibility goes hand-in-hand with maintaining 
‘effective and consistent functioning of the SSM primarily by ensuring that the supervisory 
activities carried out by the NCAs are of the highest quality and that supervisory 
requirements on all credit institutions covered by the SSM are consistent’ (ibid: Paragraph 
88). To meet this objectives, the Directorate General Micro-Prudential Supervision III 
oversees ‘NCAs’ supervisory approaches vis-à-vis less significant institutions’, ‘applies 
supervisory approaches developed by the Directorate General Micro-Prudential Supervision 
IV for significant credit institutions in a proportional manner’, ‘classifies less significant 
banks’, ‘monitors individual institutions’, ‘organises thematic reviews’ and develops 
methodologies for Risk Assessment System (‘RAS’) and Supervisory Review and Evaluation 
Process (‘SREP’) for less significant banks (ibid: Paragraph 89). 
The abovementioned non-exhaustive enumeration of the Directorate General Micro-
Prudential Supervision III’s responsibilities hints at a more proactive and ‘forward-looking’ 
approach regarding the nature and scope of the ECB’s oversight function when compared to 
the preference initially expressed by the Council. But more importantly, it seems to suggest 
that the ECB sees itself as a driving force promoting the convergence and consistency of 
different supervisory practices across the SSM. The recent SSM policy statements and 
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activities seem to confirm this assumption. As boldly stated by the ECB, ‘ensuring the 
consistent application of high supervisory standards across the SSM is the primary goal of 
indirect supervision and supervisory oversight’ (ECB 2016a: 42) which is to be achieved by 
development of joint supervisory standards and common methodologies for NCAs. In 2015, 
two sets of harmonized supervisory standards binding to the NCAs were developed. One of 
them relates to the supervisory planning process at NCA, through which they prioritize, plan 
and monitor the execution of key on-site and off-site supervisory activities for less significant 
institutions (ibid: 42). Another joint standard developed was focused on recovery planning 
(ibid: 43) and defines a framework to assess the eligibility of less significant institutions for 
simplified obligations under the BRRD regime.ix 
In comparison to the Member States’ preference to leave to the EBA the work on supervisory 
convergence (CON 2012), the ECB’s interpretation and subsequent operationalization of its 
oversight mandate seems to go beyond the original policy objectives formulated by the 
principal.  
There exist several reasons which might be driving the ECB’s push for more convergence of 
supervisory practices on the supervision of less significant banks across different NCAs, 
notably financial stability concerns. It is now widely believed that national supervisors tend 
to favour domestic banking markets and develop ‘light-touch’ supervisory standards boosting 
competitive positions of national champions in the single market (see i.a. Spendzarova 2012, 
Howarth and Quaglia 2016b) or more ‘generous treatment of banks closely associated with 
the political world’ (Wymeersch 2014: 2-3) . 
Furthermore, despite of a widespread agreement in the literature on limiting direct ECB 
supervisory competence to the largest and significant banks (see i.a. Garicano and Lastra 
2010, Ferran and Babis 2014), there exists however compelling reasons to subject all the 
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Eurozone headquartered banks to the supranational supervision. As suggested by Goyal et al., 
in a banking union ‘a larger number of small banks with correlated exposures can threaten 
systemic stability’ and the ‘ultimate goal should therefore be to supervise all banks, not just 
systemic or vulnerable ones’ (Goyal et. al 2013).  
In these circumstances, it would seem plausible to expect from the ECB as of a rationally 
bounded actor that it would develop over time a policy preference for more proactive and 
‘forward-looking’ oversight of less significant banks in order to ‘ensure (…) the stability of 
the financial system of the Union’ (Recital 30 of SSM Regulation). 
Coping with potentially mismatching positions on the SSM oversight policies  
The analysis of the way how the ECB has operationalized its oversight function in the SSM 
until this very moment points out at the existence of diverging policy objectives when 
compared to the initial position of the Council formulated in December 2012 (CON 2012), 
both with regard to its nature and scope.  
One way to approach this situation would be to declare that the ECB has gone beyond the 
original preferences of its Member-State principals and interpret this excess in terms of a 
bureaucratic drift/agency slack. In line with this argument, one may contend that the ECB has 
been efficiently using its discretion to complete the agency contract which results in 
overstretching its oversight mandate in the SSM by adding to it a more proactive and 
forward-looking dimension. Indeed, there exist very weak control mechanisms over the ECB 
action and its supranational autonomy has been widely recognized.  
However, one may also assume that while filling in the complex details of the incomplete 
agency contract, the ECB has managed to influence the initial preferences of the Council or at 
least of some of its Member-State principals by actively cooperating in order to reduce 
information asymmetries inherent to the Principal-Agent settings. Although the Principal-
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Agent framework, although it asserts that the policy objectives of rational actors are rather 
fixed and immune to pressures, does not exclude the possibility that the agents may transform 
the preferences of the configuration of the principals (Zito 2013). In this sense, rather than 
finding itself in a position of bureaucratic drift vis-à-vis their principal(s), the agent actions 
are still in line with its principal’s broad policy preferences. Insights provided by Delreux 
seem to indicate that ‘the functional benefit of delegation does not disappear when principals 
and agents cooperate, and it increases the possibility for the principals to remain active 
players in the task that is delegated to the agent’ (Delreux 2009: 205).  
There are two components of the SSM institutional design – a formal and an informal one – 
which provide stable platforms for improving the degree and quality of complex supervisory 
information exchange between the Member-State principals (more specifically: their 
supervisory high-level representatives) and the ECB. The formal component has to do with 
the composition of the Supervisory Board which is the most important decision-making body 
in the SSM. At the moment, it gathers 32 high-level members, including the Chair, the Vice 
chair, four ECB delegates and 26 representatives of 19 NCAs.x Therefore, it may be 
perceived as a venue which brings the principal and the agent together and gives them the 
opportunity to exchange their policy objectives and seek solutions on complex issues related 
to supervisory policy-making. The member of the SB shall meet regularly according to the 
agenda set by the Chair (Article 2.1 of Rules of Procedure, ‘RoP’).xi Given that all ECB 
decisions related to supervisory-policymaking in the SSM have to be endorsed by the SB, it is 
an important yardstick to gauge whether pursued policy solutions are in line with the 
Member-State principal preferences. Despite of being a part of the agent’s institutional 
structure with legally enshrined guarantees of political independence (Article 26 of SSM 
Regulation), the Supervisory Board may be also perceived to a certain degree as the Member-
State principals’ proxy. That is because national backgrounds of the Member States’ 
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representatives at the Supervisory Board tend to influence their policy-making orientations, 
as widely reported by various European and international bodies in the context of the SB’s 
‘older sister’ - the EBA Board of Supervisors (COM 2014: 9; EP 2013: 34; IMF 2013: 
Paragraph 25; EP 2014: Paragraph AU). 
Furthermore, the Chair of the Supervisory Board may be invited to participate in ‘exchange 
of views’ on the execution of supervisory tasks in the SSM with the Euro group in banking 
union composition (Art. 20(3) of SSM Regulation). More specifically, the Chair must attend 
at least two such hearings and the information exchanged must remain confidential. The Euro 
group may also request additional ‘ad-hoc exchange of views’ (Section I, par. 2 MoU). In 
2015, the Chair attended two meetings of the Euro group in banking union composition: on 
24 April the Chair presented the 2014 ECB Annual Report on supervisory activities and on 7 
December (ECB 2016AR). 
The informal component, which sets another specific channel to reduce information 
asymmetries between the Member States (more specifically: their high-level representatives) 
and the ECB, is the Senior Management Network. This network is hosted by the Directorate 
General Micro-Prudential Supervision III and is exclusively dedicated to the ECB indirect 
supervision. It is chaired by the Director General and gathers ECB and national high-level 
experts who work together on various issues relating to LSI supervision, ranging from the 
technical aspects of day-to-day supervision to policy discussions (ECB 2015: 66).  
Both the Supervisory Board and the Senior Management Network create opportunities for the 
ECB to influence dynamics of its Principal-Agent relation with the Member States and to 
reshape their policy stances on the nature and extent of the SSM oversight policies. It seems 
that so far the ECB has been successful in complementing its agency contract in line with its 
policy objectives. Crucially, it managed to get the Member States’ consent to adopt a 
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harmonized SSM-wide policy stance on the national exercise of overwhelming number of 
options and national discretions (‘OND’) vis-à-vis to less significant banks (ECB 2016b). 
They provide the competent (supervisory authorities) and the Member States’ legislatures 
with possibilities to choose how (‘an option’)xii and whether (‘a discretion’) to apply certain 
prudential requirements to credit institutions stipulated in European supervisory legislation 
(mainly CRR/CRDIV). The ONDs were the result of bargaining between the EU and 
Member States during the process of Basel III implementation and reflect the Member States’ 
interests in lowering the transaction costs (originating from ia. imposing tougher regulatory 
capital ratios) for their domestic banking sectors to the new regulatory environment (Howarth 
and Quaglia 2013, 2015). They are indeed of a very sensitive nature and high domestic 
political salience. Therefore, the ECB’s success in getting the Member States’ endorsement 
for their harmonisation is a notable example of the ECB ‘forward-looking’ and ‘proactive’ 
oversight activism. It also may be perceived in terms effective bureaucratic entrepreneurship 
resulting from the agent’s side, especially given their specific national interests and the initial 
reluctance in accepting the ECB’s policy mandate in the field of harmonisation.  
CONCLUSION 
This contribution applied the Principal-Agent framework to explain the oversight policies in 
the SSM. It demonstrated that the Member States (collective principal) and the ECB (agent) 
initially manifested differentiated policy stances on the nature and scope of the ECB 
oversight over NCA supervision of less significant banks. This partially accounts for an 
inherently incomplete nature of their agency contract which left the ECB a window of 
opportunity to set out technical details. From this angle, the discretion to fill-in the agency 
contact exercised by the ECB apparently went beyond the Member States’ preference 
formulated in the Council position on SSM (CON 2012).  
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However, rather than seeing it as an example of the agent’s transgression implying a form of 
bureaucratic drift/agency slack, what this papers offers is to follow a slightly relaxed 
approach to the main PA assumptions. From such a perspective, this development can be also 
perceived as a successful attempt to influencing the principal’s preferences by the agent.  
The explanation I put on table asserts that the ECB has used the contractual incompleteness 
(agency hold-up) to engage in two-side interaction with its principal by using different formal 
and informal channels of communication. This has reduced the information asymmetries on 
the national experts and policymakers’ side and allowed the ECB to indirectly steer the policy 
preferences of the Member States governments which they represented.  
Against this background, this case can be contemplated as an interesting and sophisticated 
form of effective bureaucratic entrepreneurship in highly complex and technical area of 
shared policy-making which ultimately expands the scope of supranational delegation but 
without inducing any manifest form of a bureaucratic drift/agency slack.  
The findings presented by this contribution largely confirm the earlier Principal-Agent 
insights on the politics of delegation in the realm of EU monetary policy, notably including 
the research conducted by Robert Elgie (Elgie 2002). The institutional design of the SSM 
may serve as the support for both arguments in favour and against shirking applied to the 
ECB’s NCA oversight policies. However, when analysed under assumption that the ECB, as 
a rationally bounded supranational agent, does have incentives to proactively reduce 
information asymmetry vis-à-vis its Member-State principals, this paper provides a useful 
insight to illuminate the relations between the principal and the agent under the incomplete 
agency contract once delegation has taken place. 
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LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1 – PA view on oversight policies in the SSM 
 
i Cf. Council Regulation (EU) of 15 October 2013 No 1024/2013 conferring specific tasks on the European 
Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions.  
ii On the ECB accountability arrangements in the context of the SSM, see Gandrud and Hallerberg (2015) for a 
political analysis and Kuile, Wissink and Bovenschen (2015) for a legal one.  
iii Cf. Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing the framework 
for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank and national 
competent authorities and with national designated authorities (SSM Framework Regulation) (ECB/2014/17). 
iv Cf. Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 17 March 2015 on reporting of supervisory 
financial information (ECB/2015/13). 
v Cf. Commission Implementing Regulation No 680/2014 laying down implementing technical standards with 
regard to supervisory reporting of institutions according to Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council. 
vi Financial reporting obligation for credit institutions takes place at consolidated level, and includes forbearance 
and non-performing exposures. 
vii Common reporting obligations for credit institutions cover own funds, capital requirements, large exposures, 
liquidity and stable funding, as well as leverage. 
viii Together with the ECB decision on the provision to the European Central Bank of supervisory data reported 
to the national competent authorities by the supervised entities pursuant to Commission Implementing 
Regulation (EU) No 680/2014. 
ix Cf. Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a 
framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council 
Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 
2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the 
European Parliament and of the Council. 
x See ECB Banking Supervision website - 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/organisation/whoiswho/supervisoryboard/html/index.en.html 
(accessed on 26 June 2016). 
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xi Cf. The Rules of Procedure of the Supervisory Board of the European Central Bank, available at 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_rop_sb_f._sign_.pdf (accessed on 26 June 2016). 
xii This could include a specific choice from alternative treatments of credit institutions. 
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